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This paper draws on the literature on exchange rate instability and 
on sunk-cost hysteresis to analyse the long-run effects of temporary 
exchange rate shocks. We propose two versions of the Dornbusch (1976) 
monetary model, modified so as to allow for endogenous adjustment in 
productive capacity, with the aggregate investment function being 
linear with respect to the exchange rate in one version and 
non-linear in the other. For both versions, we provide solutions for 
a Blanchard-type bubble (exogenously) developing on the foreign 
exhange market. We find that, if capacity adjusts nonlinearly, such a 
bubble will affect the steady-state of the economy.
I wish to thank Marcello De Cecco, Mark Salmon and Robert Waldmann 






















































































































































































1. Introduct i on
It has been recognized for some time, in particular in connection 
with exchange rate theory, that irrelevant events such as "sunspots" 
may shape actual economic outcomes, through expectational influences 
(see, for instance, Dornbusch 1982). The apparent excess volatility 
of exchange rates and events in equity markets have stimulated 
renewed interest in increasing our understanding of such phenomena 
and in determining the circumstances in which deviations from the 
level dictated by fundamentals are consistent with full rationality.1
The current state of the debate indicates that we cannot rule out the
2existence of rational bubbles on purely theoretical grounds, and 
reinforces the need to investigate their importance empirically.
In a deterministic bubble, expectations about the future asset 
prices are always fulfilled but the bubble process is not stationary, 
even when "fundamentals" are. Blanchard (1979) has developed an 
example of a non stationary bubble that has a constant (exogenously 
given) probability of bursting. This means that such bubbles will not 
go on forever, as is necessary for implausible "deterministic" 
bubbles to be rational.
In the original formulation of bubbles with a finite life, the 
effect of asset prices on fundamentals was not modelled although 
Blanchard and Watson (1982) admit its importance. An advance in the 
direction of such modelling is made by Miller and Weller (1989) who 
analyse the macroeconomic impact of foreign exchange market bubbles. 
However, in their paper, only temporary effects on the course of 





























































































More recently, the possibility of an influence of temporary 
exchange rate shocks on the underlying structure of the economy has 
been brought to the foreground by a burgeoning literature on 
hysteretic effects in trade and labour markets. Such a possibility 
means, as regards the fixed versus flexible exchange rates debate, 
that the choice will affect the first and not only the second moments 
of the real variables .
Some consequences of one kind of hysteresis, the so called 
sunk-cost hysteresis, for international trade have been explored in 
the literature. The seminal papers by Baldwin (1986) and Dixit (1987) 
propose models of hysteretic behaviour by traded goods producers and 
suggest that large exchange shocks may shift historical relationships 
between exchange rate and trade flows, leading firms to make entry 
or exit decisions in foreign markets which are not reversed when the 
currency returns to its previous level.
A first attempt to go beyond a partial equilibrium approach and 
to model the feed-back from hysteresis in trade to the exchange rate 
is in Baldwin and Krugman (1989). To do this, they go back to the
3"elasticity approach" of exchange rate determination. A step forward 
in the analysis is made by Baldwin and Lyons (1989) who implement the 
Dornbusch (1976) model. They consider the macro implications of the 
presence of micro-level sunk-cost hysteresis in the long run for the 
autonomous component of aggregate demand for domestic products. 
However it seems at least as important to take into account the 
possibility of hysteretic effects of large exchange rate movements on 




























































































decisions of domestic firms, will be seen to depend on past as well 
as current aggregate demand disturbances.
In this paper we analyse the development of a Blanchard type 
exchange rate bubble 4 using again the Dornbusch model, modified so 
as to allow for capacity being a function of the history of the real 
exchange rate. The question we ask is whether the corrective shock 
represented by the bursting of the bubble is always sufficient to 
allow the economy to go back to the path followed before the 
inception of the bubble. The answer turns out to depend upon the 
specific form that the reaction of long run supply to demand 
conditions assumes, i.e. on the specific form of hysteresis in the 
"natural" level of income.
We investigate two different cases: in the first one sunk-cost 
hysteresis leads to non linearities in the aggregate investment 
function with respect to the exchange rate so that the natural level 
of income changes discretely when the real exchange rate hits some 
trigger values.
To characterize the solution in this first model we build on the 
technique used by Wilson (1979) to analyse anticipated shocks in 
dynamic rational expectations models. The procedure we devise allows 
one to analyse all situations in which what is known is not the time 
at which the shock will happen, but the fact that the shock will 
happen when some endogenous variable hits some trigger level.We find 
that a temporary nominal disturbance such as a bubble is sufficient 
to affect permanently the economy, leading to steady-state changes 
in real income and real exchange rate. This implies that PPP need not 




























































































In the second model we propose, the reaction of aggregate supply 
to demand shocks takes place in continuous fashion, as aggregation 
smooths rnicrolevel discontinuities. The system we obtain is 
hysteretic in the sense that its transition matrix is singular, so 
that long-run values of the endogenous variables depend on initial 
conditions. We show how, by a mathematical "sleight of hand", it is 
possible to obtain a solution to the model without going through the 
heavy calculations required by the formula provided in Giavazzi and 
Wyplosz (1980) to deal with the "zero root problem". By solving this 
second model we find that temporary exchange rate disturbances such 
as bubbles are not sufficient to alter the economic outcomes in the 
long run, so that an exchange rate bubble will provoke only a 
temporary welfare loss. However we show it is important for policy 
that the hysteretic forces at work are recognized so that this loss 
which need not be negligible, can be avoided.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we 
briefly discuss sunk-cost hysteresis and its implications for 
aggregate supply changes , in the third we derive the solution for a 
stochastic exchange rate bubble when the non inflationary level of 
income jumps to a new level if the real exchange rate hits some 
trigger points; in the fourth section we consider the alternative 
continuous formulation of path dependence in the non inflationary 
level of income. The last section draws conclusions and indicates





























































































Hysteresis appears in models in which the stationary equilibrium 
depends on initial conditions so that temporary shocks have effects 
that do not go away when the shocks themselves cease to be. This can 
occur in any dynamic system which has multiple steady state 
equilibria so that a shock may move the system from one steady state 
equilibrium to another. Hysteresis can arise in different models for 
totally different economic reasons. In international economics 
particular attention has been given to sunk-costs as a possible 
source of hysteresis.5 The logic of sunk-cost hysteresis is simple: 
if to enter a market a fixed unrecoverable cost must be payed,to stay 
in a market is cheaper for an established firm than for entrant. 
Therefore demand conditions (i.e. a real exchange rate level) which 
are sufficiently good for the former to stay active will not induce 
to action the latter, i.e. the level of the exchange rate inducing 
entry will be different from the level inducing exit. Between the two 
levels is a "hysteresis band".
So far we are still in the Marshallian theory of the long versus 
the short run, based on the gap between the full and the variable 
cost. The current generation of models adds to that theory an 
explicit treatment of the expectations which firms, operating in 
different market structure,6 form about their forcing variables i.e., 
for firms engaged in international trade, the real exchange rate. The 
possibility of sunk-cost hysteresis has been shown for a broad class 
of assumptions concerning the firms’ beliefs about the process 




























































































adopts a continuous time setting, the forcing variable follows a 
brownian motion process, for which it is possible, using Bellman’s 
optimality principle and exploiting the analogy with option pricing, 
to find closed-form solutions. He shows that uncertainty dramatically 
widens the hysteresis band, for a given level of sunk-costs and 
variable costs, encouraging an attitude of wait-and-see by firms. 
Dixit suggests that the presence of mean reversion in the process 
governing the forcing variable will further widen the inaction zone. 
Other authors use a discrete time setting: in Baldwin and Krugman 
(1989) the variable is white noise, in Baldwin and Lyons (1989) it is 
an AR(1), and in Baldwin (1989) a general ARMA process; in all these 
cases the solution to the problem is obtained by using dynamic 
programming tecniques, which do not yield explicit calculations 
for the threshold values but are sufficient to prove the 
existence and boundedness of the band and to characterize how the 
width and position of the band are affected by changes in the size 
of sunk-costs and in the degree of uncertainty and persistence of 
the forcing variable process. In particular, Baldwin (1989) proves 
that the band-widening effect of volatility does not hold in general7 
but holds for processes sufficiently close to a random walk.
These articles show that shocks perceived by firms as temporary 
may lead to abandonment of sunk assets i.e. to hysteretic changes in 
the economic structure. To consider the simplest case of temporary 
shocks, suppose the maximum level of profits a firm can earn at any 
point in time, n, is an increasing function of the real exchange rate 
v, which is driven by a white noise process. The fixed entry cost is 





























































































(out of) the market. By the Bellman optimality principle the firm
will enter if v ^ v where v is such that ir(v)=F + <5(V - V )  and
i i i o i
5 is the time discount factor and will exit if v ^ v where tt(v ) =
o o
5(V - V ). It is clear that v > v . Thus a sufficiently large
o i i o
deterioration in profitability e.g. due to an overvaluation of the 
real exchange rate, may lead to profits falling below the critical 
level n= 7i(v ) and the firm leaving the market. However it will only 
re-enter if the real exchange rate depreciates enough as to make 
profits exceed the level 7̂  = n(v̂ ). If the exchange rate was
originally in the range v < v < v , a temporary overvaluation will
o i
have a permanent effect, so that a large temporary undervaluation may 
be necessary to restore the initial situation.
The specific kind of sunk-costs on which models of trade 
hysteresis have focussed are the costs necessary for exporting firms 
to set up a distribution net, to adapt the product to foreign tastes 
and regulations etc. , assets that firms give up when they leave the 
foreign market. When this happens the autonomous component of demand 
for domestic exports is lowered. However a much larger class of 
investment costs are "sunk":8 once installed, capital has little 
value unless used in production. Markets for used facilities are thin 
and discount them heavily, partly for "market of lemons" reasons. 
This means that the adjustment of productive as well as of commercial 
capacity at the micro level will be discontinuous, so that if a 
recession has led to the scrapping of machines,9 closing down of 
plants and exit of firms, it will not be sufficient for demand to get 
to the previous level for potential output to go back to its previous 




























































































of capacities depending on past history. A complete macroeconomic 
analysis of an episode of excessive appreciation will have to take 
this adverse effect on capacity into account.
However,to do so, one has previously to deal with the problem of 
aggregation of micro-level reactions. In fact, hysteresis has been 
shown to arise from sunk-costs in partial equilibrium settings. The 
simple general equilibrium analysis in Baldwin and Lyons (1989) 
implicitly assumes that statements valid at the single industry level 
will apply to the whole economy. The problem of aggregation through 
the economy is given some attention in Baldwin and Krugman (1986). 
They argue that, even if there is a continuous distribution of firms 
in terms of the real exchange rates that will make them invest or 
disinvest, it is not the case that there is always a firm on the 
margin of entry or exit, so that hysteresis bands will not be always 
eliminated at the aggregate level. Their reasoning however is not 
explicitly extended to the case in which there is a continuous 
distribution of firms in terms of the levels of their sunk-costs. 
Bean (1990), focussing on the British case, concludes that the data 
do not permit either to confirm or disprove that the relationship 
between aggregate investment and the aggregate rate of profit is 
linear. On the whole it seems impossible to get a clearcut 
theoretical answer on the point; further empirical investigation is 
obviously needed.
In this paper we consider two extreme cases, one in which the 
trigger features of partial equilibrium models are inherited at the 
macro level and the other in which they are smoothed away. One could 




























































































values of the real exchandge rates and exhibiting a discrete trigger 
feature for other values. By combining the tecniques we use for the 
two extreme cases, it would then be possible to analyse more complex, 
intermediate cases.
2. Exchange Rate Bubbles and Discrete Capacity Adjustment.
We characterize below the solution for a rational bubble, in a sticky 
price monetary model where adjustment in capacity takes place non 
linearly in response to demand shocks.
The equations of the model, before the starting of the bubble 
are as follows:
m p = ky - 11 (1)
*y = b(e - p + p ) (2)
Dp = c(y - y ) or
-00
(3)
De = i i or e
-oo
(4)
where the symbols used are defined as follows:
m the log of the domestic money stock




























































































y = the log of the GNP
y = the log of the non inflationary level of GNPn
e = the log of the exchange rate, defined as the domestic 
currency price of the foreign currency 
i = the (instantaneous) domestic nominal interest rate 
* denotes a variable in the rest of the world 
A bar above a variable denotes its long run value.
Equations (1) and (2) are the LM and IS curves respectively, (3) is a 
simple unaugmented Phillips curve and (4) an uncovered interest 
parity equation, which follows from individual optimization if agents 
are risk-neutral and the inflation rate is known with certainty, as 
is the case in this model, where it depends only on currently 
observed variables (prices, nominal exchange rates and the non 
inflationary level of income).
We have that when large shocks take the real exchange rate past 
a trigger level, potential output changes discretely. The assumed 
relationship between y and the real exchange rate is illustrated in 
Fig. 1. Starting at the origin where y equals y , it remains atn nO
this level provided v, the real exchange rate, remains between vq
and v . But if, for example, v falls below v then y falls to y as -o -0 n nl
firms in the domestic economy reduce capacity. Since there is a new
set of "marginal" firms (firms which are on the point of investing or
disinvesting ) there are new trigger points vj and v , which are
lower than the old ones. If the real exchange rate continues to fall
and passes v , then y falls again to y . Moreover, y does not - I n  n2 n




























































































bound point vj. 10
The equations of the model can be represented as:
De kbl -1 (1 - kb) I 1 e - ml _1- i*
= +
Dp cb - cb P - cyn
The determinant of the transition matrix is negative, indicating a 
saddle point equilibrium. There is a unique stable solution of the 
following form:
e - e = (cb + z)c_1b-1(p - p) (6)
where zj is the negative eigenvalue. We notice that the saddle path 
is positively sloped if kb > 1, horizontal if kb = 1 and negatively 
sloped otherwise. All other integral curves constitute divergent 
paths and correspond economically to the notion of deterministic 
self-fulfilling speculative bubbles. These bubbles however must never 
burst if they are to satisfy the postulate of rationality, causing 
the system to diverge more and more from equilibrium as time passes 
. For any given value of y , the solution of the system is of the 
kind seen above. However when the real exchange rate crosses a bound 
of a no exit- no entry band, the long-run equilibrium changes and 
there is an identical set of paths passing through the new 
equilibrium. In fact there is a whole chain of equilibrium points, 
each with its associated set of solutions. In order to introduce in 
this model a stochastic bubble of the kind proposed by Blanchard, 




























































































has a costant probability of bursting, n, in the unit of time; this 
probability is assumed for simplicity to be exogenously given, even 
if it could, inter alia, well depend in reality on the duration of 
the bubble itself. In models which do not consider the impact of a 
bubble on fundamentals, the bursting of a bubble consists in an 
immediate return of the asset price to its long run equilibrium 
level; however in the presence of a predetermined variable, here the 
price level, the most appropriate way to characterize the behaviour 
of the asset price when the bubble bursts is to assume that it 
collapses to the saddle path, along which it moves until reaching 
the long run position. In discrete time the arbitrage equation 
becomes:
(l-n)(et+Y et) + n((ct) + )c”1b"1(Pt+- p) + e - e^) = i^- i* (7)
On the right-hand side we have the interest differential, on the 
left-hand side the expected rate of change in the exchange rate. This 
is a weighted average of the change which must occur if the bubble 
persists and the magnitude of the collapse if the bubble bursts, each 
multiplied by its probability. We notice that the coefficient linking 
the deviations from long run values of the price level and the 
exchange rate along the stable manifold is the same in continuous and 
in discrete time and also that the expressions of long run values are 
the same. It is then possible, proceeding to the limit in which the 




























































































De - n(e - e - (cb + z)c Xb J(p - p)) = 1 - 1 (8)
For ease of exposition we take y as given for the moment, ignoring
n
hysteresis, so that the stationary equilibrium of the system with 
bubble and of the system without bubble are the same. We have:
De n + kbl-1 -n(cb) *(cb+z ) + (l-kb)l 1 e - e
Dp b - cb P - P
The eigenvalues of this system are:
z’= [n + kbl - cb ± ((n + kb/1- cb)2+ 4(cbl - nz))1/2]/2 (10)
One is positive and the other is negative, so we have again a 
saddle point configuration. In particular it is easily shown by 
substituting that the negative root is equal to zj , so that the 
saddle path is equal to that of the previous system, while the 
unstable root and hence all other trajectories are affected by the 
bubble; in particular, the new linear unstable path is steeper than 
in the bubbleless system (6). This is shown in Fig. 2 were the solid 
lines represent the bubbleless system and the dotted lines the system 
after the inception of a bubble. More specifically we notice that 
along the unstable paths of the latter the exchange rate diverges 
from equilibrium more rapidly than along the unstable paths of the 
former, since now the expected rate of change of thee exchange rate 
must compensate not only for the interest differential but also for 




























































































We can now relax the assumption that capacity is given and 
consider that sizable changes in demand will affect it. Suppose we 
start at an equilibrium characterized by y = y . If a finite bubble
n nl
develops, the system will have a solution of the kind:
e = B expz t + B expz’t + e (11)1 1 1 2 2 1
p = a B expz t + a’B expz’t + p (12)
* 1 1 1 1 2  2  2 1
where a’ = cb(cb + z’ ) 
2 2
The subscript on the variables refers to the fact that y is not a 
parameter: for instance ei is the steady-state nominal exchange rate 
conditional on the non inflationary level of income y
nl
Two alternatives are possible: one is that e (0) * e , so thati i
a bubble starts, but that v ^ e(0) - p ^ v  the second is that- i i  M l
ej (0) - pi ^ vi (to illustrate the model, from now on we will
consider cases in which the lower bound v is reached) so that the
misalignment is large enough to induce scrapping of sunk-assets and
we move to another system centered at y = y . After the inception
n n 2
of a bubble, to calculate the time T when the lower bound will be 
reached, given e^O) (which along with p^ (0) = pj determines B^ and 
B^ ) we must solve the equation:
e^tT) - pj(T) = Bi(1 - cb(cb + zj) *)expz T




























































































However this equation has no analytical solution and, of course, it 
is possible that it has no solution ; in this latter case the upper 
bound is reached by the bubble so that this other equation has a 
solution:
ei(r) -pi(r) = B1(1 ■ cb(cb * Zj )”* JexpZjT’
+B (1 - cbtcb + z')'*Jexpz'T' + e - p = v (14) 2 2 2 1 1 -1
However we will just examine the first case : the second one can be 
analysed along the same lines. What is not possible is that neither 
(13) nor (14) have a solution. In fact all trajectories, except 
the saddle path, asymptotically converge to the linear unstable path. 
Given that the slope of the unstable path is more than 45 degrees 
this path will intersect any 45 degrees line: now the profitability 
contours of firms, outside which we have industrial reallocation are 
just 45 degrees lines. So all trajectories will intersect them. A 
possibility we have already noticed is that T = 0, i.e. the initial 
exchange rate is such that the long run equilibrium is immediately 
affected. Once we know T, it is easy to calculate the behavior of 
the bubble from there on. We have:
e (t) = C expz t ♦ C expz’t + e (15)2 1 * 1  2 2 2
P2(t) =0^(1 - cb(cb + z^) 1)expzjt +
+ C (1 - cb(cb + z’) 'expz’t + p (16)
1 2 2 2




























































































e (0) = e (T) (17)2 1
P2(0) = Pj(T) (18)
Equation (17) is an arbitrage condition, equation (18) derives from p 
being a predetermined variable. Since v^> v^> v̂ , that means that at 
T (with reference to the old system) or at 0 (with reference to the 
new system), equilibrium is centered around y .
n2
Even if it is not possible to get a closed-form solution for T,
we can provide a qualitative characterization of the features of the
evolution of the bubbles. We have that dp = -kdy and that
de = (l-bk)b 1dy . As regards the change in the vertical intercept
of the saddle path I , we have dl = (b * + z kc *b *)dy and some 
s  s i
algebra shows that the expression inside the parentheses is negative 
iff bk > 1. The change in the vertical intercept of the linear
unstable path I is dl = (b 1 + z kb *c 1 )dy where the expression
u u 2
inside the parentheses is positive.
In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 the cases in which kb < 1 and kb = 1 are 
illustrated respectively.In both figures, before the beginning of 
the bubble, the economy is at point 1, in a long run equilibrium 
position, with y = y . Then the bubble starts, due for instance to
n n 1
some extraneous information reaching the foreign exchange market, and 
the nominal exchange rate jumps to point A. The solution of the 
system corresponding to that point is then followed until point B (of 
course assuming the bubble does not collapse before that point is 




























































































the system relative to y = y becomes relevant, finally at C we
n n2
assume the bubble bursts, which means that the exchange rate jumps to 
point D, on the new saddle path, then sliding towards the new long 
run equilibrium at 2.
In both the cases shown unless the bubble bursts before the 
critical point is reached, the final outcome is hysteresis of 
potential output. However this is not the only possible result 
:another potential outcome is that, when the bubble bursts, the 
devaluation of the exchange rate is such as to cross the upper border 
of the system centred at 2, so that the new long run equilibrium will 
be centred at 1 again. This possibility is shown again in Fig 4: if 
the bubble, after having reached point B bursts at point C’ , the 
devaluation will move the system to point D’, which is above the 
upper bound of the system centred at 2. This means that we are back 
to the system centred at 1. However, if that is the case we would 
have to reformulate the model in the sense that, starting from the 
point when the bursting of the bubble would be incompatible with the 
given level of yn thei arbitrage equation would become:
De - n(e - e - (cb + z^lc *b *(p - pj)) = i - i (19)
even if in the rest of the model the relevant y is y this is due
n n2
to the fact that investors anticipate that the bursting of the bubble 
will bring back the system to the steady-state prevailing before its 
beginning. The "convoluted", intermediate system would then be 
connected to the second system in a way analogous to that followed 




























































































Fi a somewhat paradoxical situation is shown in Fig. 5. We
see tha this case, point D (the point to which the exchange rate
would se were it to col lapse to the saddle path S )is on ther l
right if n: boundary line v = v so that in fact the long run
equi! does not shift back to 1 making the saddle path S
re 1 ■
roll v = v
ne
enough to move v? ecorom back to equl 1 i L: i e.
relevant. Unfortunately the predicament cannot be avoided simply by
ruling out bubbles producing such an outcome on grounds of
rationaiity. in fact it is easy to show that an analogous deadlock
may be the n-suit of a monetary shock. In Fig. 6, we have at point 1
the long run equilibrium when m = m_ and y = y , at point 2 the
long r in equ ibi
po um when m = m and y  ~ y . which is
1 n n 2
the
again w
point on ti saddle path S^, is on the right of v = v , so that the
saddle pat .o which it belongs is net relevant while B, the relevant
point on t saddle path S , is on the left of v = v . so that, in 3 -1
fact not S , is the relevant saddle path.
Summing up, the treatment in this section has shown that a
ra market is quite capable of
creai nr lasting damag to conomic performance by reducing pot < 
outpu




























































































unemployment, unless movements in relative factor price lead to the 
adoption of more labour intensive techniques.11
We have also demonstrated that the long-run equilibrium nominal 
and real exchange rate are path-dependent ,so that purchasing power 
parity need not hold, even in the long run, and that its violation in 
the long run, may be due to a temporary nominal shock. The theory of 
PPP has recently received a great deal of attention yet remains 
controversial. Host studies recognize the failure of PPP in the short 
run (this is in fact the point of departure of the Dornbusch model, 
which emphasizes the different speed of adjustment of asset markets 
and good markets). There is some empirical support for its failure 
in the long run as well: Frenkel (1981), Edison (1987), Corbae and 
Ouliaris (1988) among others, have suggested that divergences of 
exchange rates from PPP have been persistent. From the
perspective of policy, we notice that to avoid hysteresis fixed 
exchange rates are not needed and that a regime in which real
exchange rates are not allowed to get too far out of line, as with
12target zones, would suffice. To analyze properly the welfare effects 
of a bubble and derive the optimal policy prescriptions, we would 
require a completely specified growth level, which would mean, given 
the state of the art, making assumptions (e.g. perfectly flexible 
prices) which contradict those from which the Dornbusch model derives 





























































































3. Smooth Adjustment in Capacity
In this section we consider an alternative formulation of hysteresis 
in the natural level of income to which changes continuosly in 
proportion to its own difference from the actual level of income:
Dy = d(y - y ) (20)
n n
This can be viewed as a linear approximation to the differentiation 
of:
y (s) - y (s )) ds
n
( 2 1 )
which implies that the natural level of income is assumed to be a
moving average of past actual income levels with geometrically 
13declining weights. In fact, (20) is the continuous time analogue of 
a simple first-order partial adjustment mechanism:
= ayt (1 - a)y ( 2 2 )
from which it can be obtained by proceeding to the limit as the time 
period goes to zero.




























































































De kbl”1(1 - kbjl'1 0 e - ml i
Dp = cb - cb - c P + 0
. Dy-
db - db - d y n 0
It is immediately evident that the transition matrix is singular, 
which is the condition for the model to exhibit hysteresis in the 
sense of having the stationary equilibrium depending on initial 
conditions.
Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1985) provide a formula to allow direct 
computation of the stationary equilibrium in linear dynamic systems 
with singular transition matrices. Instead of using this formula we 
adopt a short cut by noting that:
Dy = dc *Dp (24)
n
Integrating from 0 to t we get to:
y = dc *p + y (0) - dc-1p(0) (25)
n n
so that the system can be reduced to two dimensions, by substituting 
(25) in (24):
De kbl'1 (1 - kbll'1 e , -1 . * - ml - i
= +




























































































The determinant is again negative. In the stationary state we have: 
p = (c( m + li*) + k(dp(0) - cy (0)))(dk + c)'1 (27)
n
y = y = (d(m + li*)-(dp(0) - cy (0))) (dk + c)"1 (28)n n
i =((c + db~1) (m + 1i*)-(1 - kb)b"1(dp(0)-cyn(0)))(dk +c)_1 (29)
It is clear that the steady-state level of income and of the real 
exchange rate depends on nominal as well as real exogenous variables. 
Along the saddle path we have:
e - e = (cb + d + zi)c~1b"1(p - p) (30)
where zj is the negative eigenvalue. To model a stochastic bubble 
the arbitrage equation has to be modified becoming :
De - n(e - e - (cb + d + zj)c *b 1(p - p)) = i - i (31)
When we calculate the long run values of the system after the crash
we need the initial conditions for p and y , i.e. the values of p andn
y when the bubble bursts. However, the difference dp(t) - cy (t), n n
which we use in the formulae for long run values is equal to dp(o) - 
cy (0), i.e. is a constant, which does not change as time passes.
n
This means that the stationary equilibrium of the system with bubble 




























































































De n + kbl 1 - nc Jb ’(cbt d + z^ + d-kbjl 1
1 Dp i cb -(cb + d)
P ' P
This, again, has a saddle point equilibrium. Since the positive root 
is different from the one in the bubbleless system , all unstable 
trajectories are changed by bubbles. So we have that an exchange rate 
bubble has an impact on the dynamics of the economy, leading to 
changes not only in prices, interest rate and income but also- in the 
non inflationary level of income. This may be specially important for 
the conduct of policy, interest rate and income but also in the non 
inflationary level of the latter.This may be specially important for 
the conduct of policy. If the authorities believe that the non 
inflationary level of income is a "natural" feature of the economy, 
which cannot be influenced by stabilization measures, they may not 
recognize a bubble, for instance a deflationary one, and so fail to 
fight it, e.g. by expanding money supply. 14imputing the change in the 
real exchange rate to an exogenous hange in the natural level of 
income and the simultaneous increase in prices to a change in core 
inflation.However the effects of a bubble are limited to the short 
run, in spite of the hysteretic character of the economy, so that 
after the explosion of the bubble the long-run values prevailing 





























































































This paper offers another argument to the widespread uneasiness with 
the functioning of floating exchange rates by showing how large 
misalignments, which cannot be ruled out on grounds of rationality, 
may lead to scrappage of sunk-assets: potential output is thereby
reduced. On the contrary standard models of exchange rate 
determination assume that exchange rate swings can have only 
temporary effects. We have also shown that not all forms of 
path-dependence in the non inflationary level of income lead to such 
persistent effects, which will present only if adjustment in capacity 
is discontinuous at the aggregate level. From the perspective of the 
literature on PPP, we have shown that if the aggregate investment 
functio is non linear with respect to the profit rate, large 
temporary shocks permanently the real exchange rate.
In this paper we have presented two simple models designed to 
demonstrate the potential of the argument rather than offer a 
complete analysis of the issues addressed. A natural way to extend 
the analysis conducted here would be to model explicitly 
the investment decisions of firms, assuming rational expectations on 
their part, i. e. assuming they know the macro-process determining 
the exchange rate. This would require making assumptions concerning 
the market structure in which firms operate, their production 
functions etc. Also further theoretical and empirical research should 
be carried out to deal with the aggregation problem. Yet, the fact 
that hysteresis has been shown to arise for all degrees of 




























































































monopolistic situations means that the results we have achieved here 
as regards the macroeconomic implications of sunk-cost hysteresis 





























































































1. A wide-ranging survey is provided in chapter 5 of Blanchard and 
Fisher (1989).
2. The relevant literature for exchange rate bubbles is that on 
hyperinflation and hyperdeflations, since any bubble in the 
exchange rate would have to be reflected either in a bubble in 
the price level at home or abroad or in a divergent deviation 
from PPP, which is impossible since agents cannot expect 
unexploited potential profits from commodity arbitrage to grow 
without limits.
In an infinite horizon setting it is possible to rule out 
hyperdeflations - not hyperinflations - because of a necessary 
trasversality condition.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) show that if the goverment with some 
probability fractionally backs the currency by guaranteeing a 
minimal redemption value speculative hyperinflations are ruled 
out.
Starting from the impossibility of hyperdeflations, Diba and 
Grossman (1988) show that rational inflationary bubbles can 
exist only if they have been present since the introduction of 
the fiat money. However if the bubble is stochastic, the 
probability that an hyperdeflation leads to violation of the 
transversality condiction is very small; since there is evidence 
that individuals systematically ignore very small probability 
events, this considerably weakens the arguments against 
hyperdef1at 1ons.
3. They assume capital flows are exogenous so that the exchange 
rate will take whatever value is necessary to move the 
balance of trade to the level where it exactly offsets the 
capital flows. Now, the trading volume in foreign exchange 
markets is many times greater than the volume of international 
trade in goods and services. This fact strongly supports the 
view that exchange rates adjust to equilibrate the international 
demand for stocks of national assets as opposed to adjusting to 
equilibrate the international demand for flows of national 
goods, notwithstanding the poor empirical performance of 
'asset market" models of exchange rate determination (see 
Dornbusch and Frankel 1987).
4. The fact that we have chosen to study a rational bubble does 
not mean that we do not believe in "irrationality" as a source 
of noise in assets markets. What is interesting in the rational 
bubbles literature is that "rationality" is not always enough to 
ensure market stability. Indeed a very natural "sequel" to this 
paper would be to consider the impact on the economic 
structure of other kinds of departures from the paradigm of 




























































































analysis from "growing bubbles" to "fads" and "information 
bubbles", to adopt the taxonomy proposed by Camerer (1989).
5. It is easy to show, using the analytical frameworkof sunk-cost 
hysteresis models that hysteresis can also arise from "learning 
by doing" by producers or "habit formation" by consumers.
6. The spectrum of the different structures considered goes form 
Baldwin and Krugman (1986), who analyse the case of a 
monopolistic firm , to Dixit (1987) who assumes perfect 
competition.
7. He builds a simple counter example showing that the effect is 
absent for i.i.d. expectations, if the profit function is linear 
in the real exchange rate.
8. Notice that while hysteresis models focus mainly on the 
fixed-scale project case, i.e. on entry and exit decisions, they 
can be easily extended to cover the incremental investment 
cases. Again we obtain that capacity is adjusted only when the 
forcing variable crosses the limits of the hysteresis band for 
that level of capacity.
9. Sunk-cost hysteresis models investigate the case in which it is 
not possible for firms to keep their capacity without incurring 
in maintenance costs and/or operating above a minimum level. 
Otherwise an investment would never be abandoned .since it could 
be kept alive at an infinitesimal loss by choosing a very low 
level of production . This is the fundamental difference between 
hysteresis models an irreversible investment models where 
scrapping is never profitable (see, for instance Pindyck 1988 ).
10. As we said before, the values of the triggers will depend on
the expectations of the firms as regards the process governing 
the real exchange rate.An easy way to obtain a qualitative 
picture for the case in which the exchange rate is driven by a 
bubble is to assume that firms only know the current and the 
long run value of the real exchange rate as well as the 
probability n of the bubble bursting and solve their
maximization problem by assuming that, after the inception of
the bubble, over the short time interval dt the real exchange
rate will jump to the long run equilibrium level with
probability ndt, otherwise it will remain unchanged to the 
current level. Thiskind of Poisson process is shown by Dixit 
(1987) to generate for each firm an inaction band .
11. In fact, as is well known other mechanisms for generating 
hysteresis in the natural rate of unemployment have been 
analysed arising from the functioning of the labour market 
itself: insiders’ power, outsiders’loss of human capital and/or 
use by firms of past hystory of unemployment as a screening 
device etc. Moreover there are unrecoverable costs related to 
labour( hiring , training and firing costs), so that sunk-cost 




























































































investment. See in a wide literature the articles in Cross 
(1988).
12. It is not possible here to discuss the weak points of target
zones as a halfway solution between fixed and floating rates. 
Quoting from the Robbins Lectures 1988 by P.Krugman: "target
zones will present both the problem of a temptation to try to 
sustain the wrong exchange rate, and the risk of speculative 
attack on the target that an unsustainable zone presents."
13. This is the formulation for hysteresis in the NAIRU, which 
invoking Okuns’law means also hysteresis in the "natural "level 
of income, firstly proposed by Hargreaves-Heap (1980).
14. As is well known, with perfect substitutability between domestic 
and foreign assets, sterilized intervention on the foreign 
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